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Canada has consistently failed to uphold basic human rights, including the right to food. This has 
caused widespread and persistent household food insecurity (HFI), which has become a serious, 
albeit overlooked, public health concern. Working from a political economic perspective, this 
article situates HFI within the context of poverty that has been made worse by neoliberal 
“rollbacks” to the welfare state. The majority of community and policy responses to HFI focus 
on the increased production or redistribution of food via food charity, neglecting the underlying 
issue of inadequate income. These responses may even perpetuate food insecurity by offloading 
safety net functions onto corporations and communities that cannot compensate for adequate 
welfare programs. In order to meaningfully address food insecurity as an issue rooted in poverty, 
we recommend policy interventions under the “right to food” framework, which places primary 
responsibility on the state. But unlike traditional legal conceptions of the right to food, we 
emphasize its utility as a tool for mobilizing civil society, which is a powerful yet underutilized 
source of accountability to state obligations. This approach therefore combines political action 
with policymaking, and civil society with the state, in the collective realization of the right to 
food. 
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Résumé 
Le Canada manque continuellement de maintenir les droits de la personne fondamentaux, y 
compris le droit à l’alimentation. Cela a causé une insécurité alimentaire des ménages (IAS) 
généralisée et persistante, qui est devenue un problème de santé publique grave, quoique négligé. 
Dans une optique politico-économique, cet article situe l’IAS dans un contexte de pauvreté 
aggravée par les « réductions » néolibérales de l’État-providence. La majorité des réponses 
communautaires et politiques à l’IAS se concentrent sur l’augmentation de la production ou la 
redistribution de la nourriture à travers l’aide alimentaire, négligeant le problème sous-jacent des 
revenus insuffisants. Ces réponses peuvent même perpétuer l’insécurité alimentaire en déléguant 
les fonctions essentielles aux entreprises et aux communautés qui ne peuvent pas pallier le 
manque des programmes de protection sociale. Afin d’aborder de manière significative 
l’insécurité alimentaire en tant que problème enraciné dans la pauvreté, nous recommandons des 
interventions politiques dans le cadre du « droit à l’alimentation », qui place la responsabilité 
principale sur l’État. Mais contrairement aux conceptions juridiques traditionnelles du droit à 
l’alimentation, nous soulignons son utilité en tant qu’outil de mobilisation de la société civile, 
qui est une source puissante, mais sous-utilisée de responsabilité envers les obligations de l’État. 
Cette approche réunit donc l’action politique avec l’élaboration des politiques et la société civile 
avec l’État dans la réalisation collective du droit à l’alimentation. 
 
Mots clés : insécurités alimentaires des ménages, droits de la personne, revenu, droit à 







Human Rights or Self-Righteousness? 
On the global stage, Canada fancies itself a “champion” of human rights (Government of 
Canada 2020). It boasts of ratifying seven major international human rights conventions, 
including the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESR), in which Article 
11 describes the “right...to an adequate standard of living...including adequate food, clothing, and 
housing” (ICESR 1999). This statement underscores the most basic of human necessities, and, 
given their privation in a wealthy nation, highlights one of the most profound failures in 
Canadian social policy. Canada’s shameful domestic record does not match its self-proclaimed 
leadership role in advancing human rights worldwide. 
It is not difficult to see through the cant, if only Canadians paid attention. The federal 
government’s broken commitments lie in plain sight, as notoriously exemplified by Vancouver’s 
Downtown Eastside. In the world’s 13th most industrialized country (UNDP 2019), in what is 
supposedly its “most liveable city” (The Economist 2019) in a neighbourhood adjacent to tourist 
landmarks, one will find a concentration of shelters, soup kitchens, and bread lines (Riches & 
Graves, 2007). The public is divided into two camps - those who stigmatize these services and 
others who commend their altruism, with neither side recognizing the broader, more 
longstanding, structural forces that made them necessary.  
In this article, we argue that reliance on food aid is unacceptable, not because of the 
people who rely on it, but because the government has neglected their basic rights, which has left 
communities struggling to provide for their needs. Consider that community services are not so 
much solutions as they are signs of perpetual emergency – accentuated, no less, by the 
Downtown Eastside’s constant shriek of sirens. At first, they are jarring to the ears; eventually, 
they become white noise. 
A Food Insecure State 
While normalized domestically, the Canadian government’s violation of the right to food 
has begun to attract overdue international attention. In 2012, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, led an envoy to Canada, his first to an affluent, industrialized 
country. During his visit, he condemned the country’s state of food insecurity, remarking that 
“it’s even more shocking…to see that there are 900,000 households in Canada that are food 
insecure and up to 2.5 million people precisely because this is a wealthy country. It’s even less 
excusable” (Postmedia News, 2012).  
Despite moral outrage, these numbers still vastly underrepresent the magnitude of 
household food insecurity, commonly defined in Canada as “the inadequate or insecure access to 
sufficient food because of financial constraints” (Dachner & Tarasuk, 2018). The 
aforementioned statistics only reflect food bank usage data, which actually underestimates food 
insecurity rates as reported in national nutrition surveillance data by 4-5 times (Loopstra & 





which all provinces participated1 in the Household Food Insecurity Module (HFIM) that is used 
to measure the prevalence and severity of food insecurity in Canada, some degree of food 
insecurity was reported to affect 12.7% of households, amounting to 4.4 million Canadians 
(Tarasuk & Mitchell, 2020). Nevertheless, De Schutter’s visit precipitated a UN report that 
highlighted the renewed urgency of food insecurity in the Global North, where it has been a 
persistent, yet overlooked, public health concern (De Schutter, 2012). HFI is closely associated 
with poor physical, mental, and social health outcomes such as chronic disease, depression, 
social isolation, and premature death (Bhargava et al., 2012; Black et al., 2012; Bronte-Tinkew et 
al., 2007; Davison et al., 2015; Men et al., 2020; Seligman et al., 2010; Seligman & Schillinger, 
2010; Tarasuk et al., 2013; Vozoris & Tarasuk, 2003). That people are dying of food scarcity in 
one of the world’s wealthiest nations is a disgrace; that the deficiency lies within the food supply 
is a disguise. 
While the urgency of reducing food insecurity is widely accepted, its framing narratives 
are more contested. De Schutter (2012) rightly portrays HFI amid economic inequality, a context 
that has been obscured by popular discourses that emphasize the local production and/or 
charitable distribution of food. Local food movement discourses inaccurately frame food 
insecurity as a problem arising from the food system as opposed to labour and welfare systems at 
large. Even worse, food charity discourses suggest that the redistribution of surplus food is a 
suitable response to this problem. Charitable initiatives not only deliver negligible impacts on 
food insecurity outcomes (Tarasuk, 2017; Loopstra, 2018), along with negative implications for 
personal dignity and agency, but they also inappropriately use one symptom of neoliberalism, 
which is a wasteful food system, to superficially treat another, which is an inadequate social 
safety net (Riches, 2018). Such lack of discursive clarity occurs in part because these 
frameworks respond to the broader concept of food security, to which food insecurity, as defined 
in population health research (e.g., CCHS), does not represent a direct antonym. Their respective 
primary concerns about food supply and economic access to food, while equally important, are in 
fact minimally related in most urban regions within the Global North (Power, 1999; Tarasuk, 
2001a). 
Although food security, by definition, “exists when all people, at all times, have physical 
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life” (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations [FAO], 1996), the term in food security literature  generally connotes the scale of food 
supply at national and community levels. As a result, the emphasis placed on sustainable food 
systems tends to obscure issues of economic access to food. It is worth noting that food 
insecurity in Indigenous communities, unlike in the general Canadian population, is tightly 
entwined with the food system. Self-sufficiency in food acquisition is especially important for 
northern Indigenous communities amid lack of food affordability due to distance from markets, 
                                                
1 This cycle represents complete national data that can be compared longitudinally to other years with full 






an ineffective federal food subsidy program (Nutrition North Canada), diminishing access to 
traditional foods, not to mention the imperative of decolonization (Dachner & Tarasuk, 2018). 
Even in these environments, however, financial resources are essential for accessing food 
through market or traditional channels, which returns to the central problem of inadequate 
income (Pirkle et al., 2014). In regions with a secure supply of food, food insecurity typically 
occurs at the household level, where the condition is primarily caused by inadequate income 
resulting from deficient social policy (Riches & Tarasuk, 2014; Tarasuk, 2001b).  
This is the case in wealthy nations such as Canada, where weakening income-based 
policies have been superficially substituted by food redistribution and production initiatives. To 
distinguish between these approaches, we return to Dachner and Tarasuk’s (2018, p. 230) 
definition of food insecurity as “the inadequate or insecure access to sufficient food because of 
financial constraints.” Further to this conceptualization, we utilize Riches & Silvasti’s (2014) 
interpretation of food security as the absence of need for food banks, soup kitchens, breadlines, 
and dumpster diving. Paradoxically, these activities represent features of community food 
security, on the one hand, and widespread household food insecurity on the other. The present 
argument focuses on the latter issue, which is rooted in the structural problem of income 
inequality. 
Political Economy 
Among income-based conceptualizations of food insecurity, political economy is the only 
theoretical framework that addresses both the social and ideological context of HFI (Mendly-
Zambo & Raphael, 2019). Although the political economy of food and related structural 
frameworks are well-established in existing literature (Bernstein, 2016; Friedmann, 1993; 2012), 
the political economy of HFI is largely underdeveloped with the exception of Graham Riches’ 
(1986; 1997; 2002; 2011; 2018) pioneering work in this field. From his perspective, the 
institutional entrenchment of corporate charity has largely contributed to the decline of social 
policy in wealthy “food bank nations.”  
In addition to Riches’s work, this paper’s theoretical approach also derives from Fisher’s 
(2017) indictment of corporate involvement in the anti-hunger movement, Tarasuk’s (Tarasuk, 
2001a; 2001b; 2017; Tarasuk & Beaton, 1999; Tarasuk, Dachner, & Loopstra, 2014; Tarasuk & 
Eakin, 2005; Tarasuk, Mitchell, & Dachner, 2014; 2016) extensive work on the social 
determinants of food insecurity, and Lightman and Lightman’s (2017) institutionalist critique of 
Canadian social policy more generally. According to their analyses, HFI is a direct result of 
neoliberal policies, mainly related to rollbacks in social welfare, that have had deep 
consequences for the ability of households to afford basic necessities such as food.  
Building upon this perspective, the present article situates the causes and solutions to HFI 
– as a matter of income rather than food – in Canadian public policy. First, we establish the 
context and politics of HFI using political economic theory. From this vantage point, we then 
critique current policy responses to HFI, including the lack of such policies. Using secondary 





identified by Mendly-Zambo and Raphael (2019), queried using relevant search terms such as 
“food insecurity,” “right to food,” “food banks,” and “community food programs,” and then 
selected based on their relevance in the contemporary (2010–2020) Canadian context. Finally, 
we develop recommendations for upholding the right to food through multiple sectors of society, 
albeit with the majority of responsibility assigned to its primary duty bearer: the state.  
The Political Economy of Household Food Insecurity: 
The Rise and Fall of the Canadian Welfare State 
Given the inextricable link between income and food, we must first look to macro-scale 
processes that have produced income inequality and, consequently, contributed to food 
insecurity. Contrary to the capitalist myth of market self-regulation, the vagaries of economics 
are not naturally occurring, but are the result of interventions that are intrinsically political. 
Widespread inequality was not always the status quo; nor should it continue to be.  
Between the Second World War and the mid-1970s, income inequality in Canada 
decreased in large part due to the development of a robust Canadian social security system 
(Power, 1999), following the creation of its British counterpart in 1945 (Lightman & Lightman, 
2017). These interventions were heavily influenced by the work of John Maynard Keynes, who 
proposed social spending to offset declines in the economy, and Lord William Beveridge, who 
emphasized the government’s leadership role in meeting the collective needs of society through 
social programs (Lightman & Lightman, 2017). Their ideas did not take hold to the same extent 
in the United States, which retained the Victorian “Poor Laws”-era preference for social 
assistance programs that are charitable and conditional rather than public and universal (Myles, 
1998). Implicit in the latter model is recognition for citizenship entitlements that are now 
understood, but not necessarily upheld, as human rights. 
Post-war support for the welfare state was arguably born of collective memory of the 
Great Depression, wartime egalitarian ideals, and consensus between labour and capital 
(Lightman & Lightman, 2017). Although food banks appear to be permanent fixtures of society 
today, we tend to forget that they were virtually nonexistent in Canada between the Great 
Depression and the 1980s (Power,1999), during which they were unnecessary due to functional 
social policy. The subsequent proliferation of food banks (to be discussed later in this article), 
beginning with the United States, and then spreading across industrialized nations (Fisher 2017; 
Riches 2018), thus points to the ensuing decline and corporate capture of social welfare. 
The oil crisis of 1973 represents a watershed event that shifted political priorities from 
social welfare to economic growth; from Keynesianism to neoliberalism; from human rights to 
corporate interests. Ever since, Canadian social spending has retreated to levels that are among 
the lowest in the industrialized world , ranking 25th in social expenditures as a percentage of 
GDP out of 37 OECD nations (OECD, 2019b). This marks a convergence with the American 
welfare model, characterized by market responses to basic entitlements (Myles, 1998), from 
which Canada has historically distinguished itself. Over the past several decades, neoliberalism 






involvement, and reduced taxation at the expense of adequate wages, secure employment, and 
social assistance programs that respond to citizens’ financial, health, and social needs – food 
being among the most basic of these (Riches & Tarasuk, 2014).  
Altogether, household food insecurity (HFI) is predominantly a function of income 
instability and insecurity, and secondarily influenced by access to savings and assets, chief 
among them home ownership, as well as costs of living (Dachner & Tarasuk, 2018). The 
inextricable link between financial resources and food insecurity is well understood, with proven 
historical and contemporary solutions in income policies (Procyk, 2014; Emery et al., 2013; 
Tarasuk, 2017). The majority of responses to HFI at present, however, focus on the increased 
production of food within communities and the redistribution of food via corporate charities and 
the nonprofit sector, a preference that is politically motivated. In the following section, we 
compare these competing approaches to HFI reduction. 
Comparing Apples to Oranges:  
Food- and Income-based Responses to Household Food Insecurity 
Food-based Community Responses 
Efficacy 
The present article questions the efficacy and suitability of food-based responses to HFI 
which are typically undertaken by communities. Contrary to popular perception, Tarasuk (2017) 
and Loopstra (2018) report that there is no evidence to suggest that community food initiatives 
reduce HFI. Studies thus far, while limited, have only indicated the contrary: that they grant 
marginal relief to a small subset of the population without improving dietary outcomes at the 
community level (Loopstra, 2018). Less than one-quarter of food insecure Canadians use food 
banks (Loopstra & Tarasuk, 2015), and, of these individuals, 70% of participants in Tarasuk and 
Beaton’s (1999) study reported severe food insecurity despite regular food bank usage. More 
recently, Tarasuk et al. (2019) found that food bank use was one of the least utilized strategies 
for augmenting household resources, with a meagre 21.1% of severely food insecure households 
reporting food bank use. 
Lack of efficacy applies not only to food banks intended for emergency relief, but also to 
initiatives focused on community capacity building (e.g. community gardens and kitchens)  – 
perhaps even more so due to their smaller scale. Although studies of community kitchens 
(characterized by educational cooking activities) have demonstrated increases in access to 
healthy food among participants (Iacovou et al., 2013), these benefits tend to be tenuous due to 
precarious funding, staff availability, and program schedules (Engler-Stringer & Berenbaum, 
2007; Loopstra, 2018). In a study of healthy “good food box” programs, food insecurity among 
participants remained unchanged after an eight-month period (Miewald et al., 2012). Increases to 
food insecurity for program dropouts may have been more indicative of declining socio-
economic circumstances than they were of program efficacy (Loopstra, 2018). This finding 





outcomes, as they certainly do for other objectives such as social connectivity, participation 
would still depend on social circumstances of households and on the capacity of community-
based organizations to provide childcare, transportation, and other social supports. Improvements 
to household circumstances tend to require structural interventions beyond the domain of 
communities, particularly those with limited resources.  
Suitability 
Although the impetus towards increasing capacity, empathy, food quality, and inclusivity 
may improve both charitable and capacity-building services, these measures still fail to address 
the structural source of HFI, which is a malfunctioning welfare state – not an insufficient food 
system. Ultimately, people are food insecure not because they lack access to food programs, 
affordable food retail, or food skills, but because they do not have enough money to purchase 
sufficient, healthy food (Tarasuk, 2017; Huisken & Tarasuk, 2017). If HFI is defined as the 
“[inadequate] access to the variety or quantity of food that they need due to lack of money” 
(Statistics Canada, 2015, italics added) or “the inadequate or insecure access to sufficient food 
because of financial constraints” (Dachner & Tarasuk, 2018, italics added), then food programs 
do nothing to improve the financial circumstances underpinning this condition.  
Charitable food initiatives not only fail to redress, but may even reinforce, political 
economic structures that produce HFI. If the goal is to truly eliminate HFI, then the aim should 
be to make the demand for food banks obsolete (Fisher, 2017; Riches, 2018). Instead, the food 
bank system has focused on expanding operations and increasing supply, which has the 
counterproductive effect of placating urgency for social assistance reform. In other words, food 
banks are primarily concerned with “feeding the need,” thereby reinforcing social dependency on 
food banks instead of “shortening the line” which would reduce the need for food banks (Fisher, 
2017). This occurs because there are stakeholders, namely corporations and neoliberal 
governments, with vested interests in maintaining public reliance on the charitable sector. 
The irony of the food bank model is that it relies on donations from corporations (e.g., 
Walmart) that do not pay their employees living wages, which is a significant contributor to HFI 
(Fisher, 2017; Riches, 2018). Due to their extensive control, food charity discourses portray 
corporate donors as part of the solution to hunger without holding them accountable for their role 
in creating HFI through exploitative labour practices. For these entities, food bank donations are 
a relatively cost-effective method of cloaking culpability for HFI under a banner of social and 
environmental responsibility, with the added benefits of tax credits and the convenience of 
disposing food waste (Riches, 2018; Fisher, 2017; Suschnigg, 2012).   
Meanwhile, senior governments indirectly support food charity through donations, the 
provision of tax credits, and supportive policies in order to offload HFI action onto communities 
as well as the corporate sector which is a beneficiary of this arrangement (Tarasuk, Dachner, & 
Loopstra, 2014; McIntyre, Patterson, Anderson, & Mah, 2016). In 2017, the BC government, for 
instance, contributed $10 million to Food Banks BC to expand refrigeration capacity in lieu of 






Columbia, 2017; Mendly-Zambo & Raphael, 2019). In Nova Scotia, which has the 4th highest 
rate of food insecurity (Tarasuk & Mitchell, 2020) and the 4th lowest minimum wage in Canada 
(Statistics Canada, 2020b), the provincial government provides tax credits to farmers in return 
for food bank donations (Government of Nova Scotia, 2016). These policies parallel American 
institutional arrangements that gave rise to the simultaneous retrenchment of welfare programs 
and entrenchment of food banks, particularly through a United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) emergency food purchasing scheme (The Emergency Food Assistance Program) that 
was designed to alleviate economic crises caused by agricultural overproduction (Lohnes 2020). 
Tellingly, rates of HFI have only worsened over nearly 40 years of food banking and 
several decades of emerging community-based food initiatives in Canada (Riches & Tarasuk, 
2014). Even with the provision of healthy food in some initiatives, these programs still restrict 
choice and autonomy due to their clientele’s lack of purchasing power. In this regard, food-based 
initiatives – even those operating with best practices – only represent superficial, “top-soil” 
responses that bury deep-rooted structures that promote and perpetuate income inequality.  
Food Policy Responses 
Owing to their political and public popularity, food-based approaches have gained 
influence in the policy arena just as income-based approaches have declined. In cities, food 
strategies that function as roadmaps for local food policies and initiatives have become popular 
with municipal authorities worldwide (Sonnino, 2016). While significant for purposes of 
sustainability and community development, these documents carry limited utility for HFI 
reduction because they focus on the production/distribution of food rather than the financial 
means to purchase it. This is partly by nature of jurisdiction since income policies, unlike local 
food policies, lie largely beyond municipal control (Mah & Thang, 2013; Collins et al., 2014). 
Relative to social policy advocacy, charitable initiatives also represent a visible sign of action 
that delivers resources immediately, however inadequately or ineffectively.  
At the federal level, the newly-unveiled Food Policy for Canada similarly sidesteps issues 
of poverty, notably ignoring Food Secure Canada’s (2017) recommendation of creating an 
income floor to ensure that all Canadians can afford food. Despite emphasizing the need to 
improve access to food, particularly for “the poor and people in vulnerable situations,” the 
national food policy received criticism for its lack of acknowledgement for income interventions 
(Government of Canada, 2019). Instead, it focuses on community food initiatives for which the 
federal government pledged $50 million to local food infrastructure “primarily for the less 
privileged” (Government of Canada, 2019). Even according to an executive of FoodShare 
Toronto, which runs community food programs, “this is not how we respond to a crisis like food 
insecurity,” which is an issue that is “largely around income” (Hui, 2019). In McIntyre and 
Anderson’s (2016, p. 33) words, “the only way to eliminate household food insecurity in Canada 





Whether the cost of food rises or falls, a variable potentially affected by food policy, the 
overriding determinant of HFI is income. In Canada, the cost of food is already low relative to 
other countries (Black, 2015), whereas rates of poverty and income inequality are higher than in 
other industrialized countries with stronger systems of social support (Raphael et al., 2018). 
According to the USDA (2019), Canadian consumers spend, on average, 9.1% of household 
income on food – the fifth lowest rate among 104 countries surveyed. Yet out of 36 OECD 
countries with available data in 2016, Canada ranked 24th in social welfare expenditures as a 
percentage of national GDP (OECD, 2019b). This may explain why Canada’s relative income 
poverty measure (0.12 in 2016), which describes the share of the population with an income of 
less than 50% of the national median income, has been consistently higher than that of countries 
with higher levels of social spending, such as Finland (0.06), Sweden (0.09), Denmark (0.06), 
Norway (0.08), Belgium (0.1), France (0.08), Germany (0.1), and the Netherlands (0.08) (OECD 
2019a). Similarly, Canada’s GINI coefficient (0.307), which measures income inequality, is 
larger than that of all aforementioned countries. Given Canada’s relatively low cost of food, and 
high rates of poverty, policies pertaining to income hold more relevance to HFI reduction than 
those organized around the food system, such as funding for local food infrastructure. 
Income Policy Responses 
Income-based responses, the domain of provincial and federal governments, have 
consistently proven to be much more effective than food-based initiatives, which tend to occur at 
the community level (Loopstra, 2018). Income supports afforded to Canadian seniors, which 
essentially provide them with a guaranteed basic income, represent an exemplar for HFI 
reduction in the social determinants of health (SDH) literature (Emery et al., 2013a; McIntyre, 
Dutton, Kwok, & Emery, 2016; Dachner & Tarasuk, 2018; Tarasuk, 2017). To illustrate, the risk 
of HFI among individuals on income assistance drops by nearly 50% when Canadians reach 
pension age, at which point they are eligible for Guaranteed Income Supplement and Old Age 
Security payments.  When combined, these provide more than double the income of individuals 
on provincial welfare in most cases (McIntyre, Dutton, Kwok, & Emery, 2016; Dachner & 
Tarasuk, 2018).  
A notable example of policy solutions at the provincial level is Newfoundland and 
Labrador’s implementation of a poverty reduction strategy in 2006, which nearly halved the 
incidence of HFI among social assistance (Income Support) recipients between 2007 and 2012 
(Loopstra et al., 2015). This plan included the following measures: improvements to Income 
Support rates, which were increased and indexed to the cost of living; the facilitation of 
employment among Income Support recipients through cash transfers and the retention of 
benefits for the first month of employment; and the reduction in costs of living through 
affordable housing policies, extended prescription coverage, enhanced childcare support, and 
decreased taxation for low-income households (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
2006; 2014). In addition to social services, the poverty reduction plan also addressed inadequate 






years, however, the rollback and neglect of such policies has led to the province currently having 
the second lowest minimum wage in Canada (Government of Canada, 2020), and not 
surprisingly, the 3rd highest rate of food insecurity (15.9%) (Tarasuk & Mitchell, 2020). 
The present commentary takes place amid incipient policy action against poverty and 
HFI, with several recent developments pertaining to these matters. In 2018, the federal 
government released Canada’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy, which set poverty reduction 
targets of 20% by 2020, and 50% by 2030, relative to 2015 levels. If these goals are to be met, 
they would certainly have a large impact on HFI reduction. Although the outcomes of this 
strategy remain to be seen, the establishment of HFI rates as an indicator for poverty reduction 
progress, albeit with no proposed reduction benchmarks, at least represents recognition of the 
problem (Government of Canada, 2018). British Columbia then unveiled its own poverty 
reduction strategy in 2019, the first of its kind in the province, with a reduction target of 25% by 
2024. While the federal and provincial strategies represent important initial steps towards 
poverty reduction, they are far from comprehensive, and are notably vague about food insecurity 
specifically. Critics of BC’s Poverty Reduction Strategy argue that it introduces few new 
interventions beyond ones that have been deemed insufficient thus far. The upcoming minimum 
wage increase to $15.20/hour, for instance, still falls below the living wage required to live in the 
Vancouver region, which was estimated to be $20.91/hour (Ivanova et al., 2018). Moreover, 
meagre increases of $100/month in 2017 and $50/month in 2019 to both Income Assistance and 
Disability Assistance rates fail to compensate for a decade-long freeze in rates between 2007 and 
2017 (Robinson, 2019). These increased rates respectively leave income and disability payments 
at 50% ($760/month) and 65% ($1235/month) of the Market Basket Measure, which is the 
federal and BC provincial poverty line measure (Ivanova & Hemingway, 2019). Other than the 
2019 hike in income and disability assistance, the BC Poverty Reduction Strategy, as with 
poverty reduction approaches in most other provinces, has not pledged additional increases to 
these rates, which remain inadequate for covering basic needs, including food and shelter, let 
alone for living a dignified life.  
As mentioned previously, both federal and provincial poverty reduction strategies 
prioritize members of the “deserving poor,” such as children and families, over their 
“undeserving” counterparts, which includes individuals who are unable to participate in the 
labour force due to physical and mental challenges. This selective approach was ineffective in 
Ontario, where the prevalence of HFI remained stable over the past decade despite the rollout of 
its own poverty reduction strategy. Tarasuk (2017) attributes its lack of success to the focus on 
households with children, which excludes a large proportion of other households similarly 
experiencing food insecurity. However, Brown and Tarasuk (2019) found that rates of severe 
food insecurity decreased by one-third among low-income families following the introduction of 
the Canadian Child Benefit in 2016, demonstrating the powerful impact of policy decisions that 
improve, even modestly, the economic circumstances of households. These results provide the 
rationale for extending similar policy interventions to other sectors of society, or better, all who 





One limitation of existing interventions – such as increases to the minimum wage, social 
assistance rates, and affordable housing – is their piecemeal approach which targets specific 
population groups individually and inequitably (Tarasuk, 2017), with a bias towards the 
“deserving poor.” Since the common denominator among a diverse food insecure population is 
inadequate income, a Basic Income Guarantee (BIG), according to SDH proponents, would 
theoretically reach the entire food insecure population at once (Tarasuk, 2017). In an 
encouraging development for HFI reduction, a basic income approach is currently being studied 
by the BC and Prince Edward Island governments (Government of British Columbia, 2019; Yarr, 
2020).  
Quebec has also expressed plans to implement a basic income in its Government Action 
Plan to Foster Economic Inclusion and Social Participation (Government of Quebec, 2017), but 
it is still restricted to people with limited capacity for employment, in other words members of 
the “deserving poor.” This document builds upon two previous poverty reduction strategies 
which introduced public investments worth $4.4 billion from 2004–2010 and $7.1 billion from 
2010–2015. These measures, which include universal child assistance, an annual review of the 
minimum wage, the construction of affordable housing, as well as the indexation and 
supplementation of social assistance benefits, have contributed to the province’s second-lowest 
rate of poverty (7.9%) (Statistics Canada, 2020b) and lowest rate of food insecurity (11.1%) 
(Tarasuk & Mitchell, 2020) in Canada. Notably, all three documents signal the province’s overt 
recognition for human rights, poverty being in tacit violation of social and economic rights 
(Government of Quebec, 2004; 2010).  
From Policy to Politics 
From a political economy perspective, a BIG might still fail to account for broader 
structures of power within which it would be embedded (Raphael et al., 2018). While a Basic 
Income Guarantee would certainly reduce poverty and its attendant social symptoms such as 
HFI, this effect can only go as far as Canada’s deficient welfare state allows. In this policy 
environment, a BIG would be unlikely to elevate low-income people to comfortable levels above 
the poverty line – especially in the absence of additional social supports such as subsidized 
housing, prescription drugs, employment training, and national childcare (Raphael et al., 2018). 
While progressive proponents of a BIG typically advocate for a concurrent expansion of social 
supports such as housing and childcare, neoliberal policymakers have also co-opted the BIG 
approach as a strategy for dismantling and privatizing social programs to be traded in an 
inequitable market economy (Young, 2009). Given that food is primarily a market commodity in 
Canada (outside of Indigenous and Northern communities), we consider both fundamentally 
adequate incomes and necessary social supports to be public entitlements. Targeted social 
programs are particularly important for people who are often excluded from the labour market 
(e.g. women). Policy interventions must also be integrated, multi-pronged, and intersectional in 
order to redress multiple systems of oppression (e.g. patriarchy, racism, colonialism) within 






The risk of rollbacks to these social supports, potentially justified by a neoliberal rollout 
of a BIG, is particularly high in “liberal” welfare states which promote the prioritization of 
market rather than state solutions to welfare problems (Myles, 1998). Compared with other 
OECD nations, liberal welfare states including Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, and the USA 
contain greater income inequality, higher poverty rates, and diminished social supports because 
business interests increasingly take precedence over the basic needs and rights of citizens 
(Raphael et al., 2018). It’s no coincidence that these countries comprise Riches’ (2018) core 
group of “food bank nations” which have expanded to encompass high- and middle-income 
countries across the globe. The retrenchment and appropriation of welfare regimes worldwide, as 
evidenced by the spread of institutionalized food banks, is a direct consequence of neoliberalism.  
Under neoliberalism, Canadian governmental responses to HFI have primarily consisted 
of inaction and indifference, if not outright denial. In 2012, the former Immigration Minister of 
the Conservative government, Jason Kenney, famously denounced concerns raised by De 
Schutter’s UN hunger envoy as “completely ridiculous” and a “waste of resources to come to 
Canada to give political lectures” (Canadian Press, 2012). For all his willful ignorance, Kenney’s 
response ironically illuminated the politics of HFI. More recently, the Ontario Progressive 
Conservative government’s abrupt termination of a basic income pilot research program 
launched under the former Liberal government is another  example of political influence and 
shortsightedness in HFI reduction policies (Rushowy, 2018). Since basic income experiments are 
likely to outlast the political regimes that undertake them, Mendelson (2019) recommends the 
appointment of external agencies, with the endowment of adequate funds upfront, to run future 
studies to completion. Decades ago, a similar Canadian minimum income experiment 
(Minicome) involving 1,300 households and a rigorous research component from 1975–1979 
ended before producing a final report (Hum & Simpson, 1993). Although some of the original 
data was lost, participants later reported measurable improvements in the community’s health as 
a result of its poorest members receiving a guaranteed cash supplement (Forget, 2011). Archival 
qualitative accounts also suggest that the experiment provided income benefits without stigma 
and helped to break down the distinction between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor 
(Calnitsky, 2016). In all likelihood, these basic income studies were cancelled not in spite of 
their preliminary success, but because of it. 
In theory, at least in income-based frameworks, BIG appears to be the most logical policy 
response to HFI. In practice, policy decisions are at least as ideological as they are logical. 
Despite the growing body of literature critiquing the policy environment surrounding HFI 
(Tarasuk, 2017; Emery et al., 2013b; Dachner & Tarasuk, 2018), governments have paid little 
heed to recurring recommendations for strengthening social supports with some recent 
exceptions. Mendly-Zambo and Raphael (2019) argue that policy analysis has hitherto been 
ineffective due to its failure to reckon with political motivations for governmental indifference. 
In the following section, we invoke the ‘right to food’ in order to build political momentum for 





The Right to Food 
To safeguard access to food in the age of neoliberalism, and hopefully thereafter, we echo 
Riches and Tarasuk’s (2014) call for a change of public perspective: from food as a need to be 
voluntarily met by charity systems, to food as a right to be secured through social policy action. 
The right to food, defined as “the right [of] every man, woman and child, alone or in community 
with others, [to] have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its 
procurement” (ICESR, 1999), implies the redistribution of wealth, rather than food, within high-
income countries. In popular discourse, it is commonly misconstrued as the right to be fed, which 
is something that food charity can accomplish to a limited extent. Rather, the right to food 
describes state obligations to allow people to feed themselves with dignity, something that a food 
bank cannot provide.  
Although the principle of autonomy underlies our argument against charity, we 
acknowledge that this conceptualization tends to overlook the caregiving role of women, 
especially in the domestic sphere. Those who are unable to feed themselves, such as children, 
often rely on women for food, breastfeeding, and meal preparation. Since this work operates in 
relational networks that exist outside of the market economy, it can be a source of fulfillment on 
one hand, and vulnerability on the other, for care providers and recipients alike (van Esterik, 
1999; Frank, 2015). Hence the need for a more intersectional interpretation of the right to food 
that includes the “right to feed,” which would enshrine as entitlements the resources necessary 
for predominantly female caregiving work that has been vastly undervalued (van Esterik, 1999). 
Such recognition may not only support female providers of care, but also encourage men to 
assume a higher proportion of these domestic duties. Considering the traditionally inequitable 
division of domestic labour, the “right to feed” should also promote female participation in the 
labour force for those who derive empowerment from employment. Ultimately, this is a matter of 
choice – a central tenet to the right to food and a recurring theme in this article. Whether through 
employment or caregiving, the right to food, and to feed, commands labour and welfare supports 
(e.g. increased income, parental leave, childcare) that once again highlight the imperative for 
social policy interventions as opposed to charitable approaches. 
Another misconception about the right to food is that the general population should feed 
itself by growing its own food. Among the two modes of food procurement recommended by the 
UN, it is much more feasible for wealthy nations to provide its citizens with “money and access 
to the market,” which represent the main mode of food acquisition in these countries, than it is 
for them to provide “land, seeds, water, and other resources,” especially in urban environments 
(United Nations, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, if individual agency is an organizing principle in the 
right to food, there is scarce agency in the inability to buy food on one’s own terms, even with 
the ability to produce or prepare one’s own food. From an income-based perspective, this is the 
local food movement’s main theoretical fallacy. To illustrate, research from PROOF indicates 
that HFI is associated not with neighbourhood food environments in cities (Kirkpatrick & 






which represent cornerstones of local food initiatives, but primarily with inadequate income 
(Tarasuk, 2017), an issue not fully addressed by these programs. Although the local food 
movement supports the livelihoods of food producers, it tends to ignore those of the general 
population, the majority of whom do not work in the agrarian sector in industrialized countries. 
Within the local food movement, the frameworks of community food security and food 
sovereignty are commonly framed as critical antitheses to charitable initiatives – a claim that we 
support with respect to the food system but question within the context of social policy. Both 
frameworks seek to return means of food production and distribution to the local scale in order to 
promote sustainable and ethical food systems, albeit with subtle differences. Community food 
security tends to emphasize community development objectives such as social connectivity and 
education, which are often connected to charitable food initiatives, while food sovereignty is 
more politically radical in challenging the commodification of food, exploitative supply chains, 
as well as social inequalities produced by urban planning and the inequitable distribution of 
wealth. Although the last topic represents the focus of this paper, which is certainly aligned with 
food sovereignty in this sense, income is often insufficiently prioritized relative to the other 
factors.  
The centrality of market-based access to food also calls into question the dichotomization 
of rights and commodities. When food production represents a source of livelihoods rather than 
subsistence, as is promoted within the food sovereignty framework, it typically (but not 
necessarily) depends on the commodification of food to generate income for producers. In the 
Global North, the violation of the right to food arguably involves a different system of 
commodification: that of welfare entitlements, which have become entirely conditional on the 
ability to participate in a labour market that lacks adequate jobs and incomes (Riches, 1997). 
In spite of these contradictions, food system and income-based concerns can still be 
complementary – and should be – if we are to truly realize the right to sustainable, adequate, and 
accessible food. Increased incomes would likely strengthen supply chains by enabling consumers 
to purchase more foods from local producers. In this sense, the local food movement’s rhetoric 
of empowerment can be actualized through purchasing power, arguably to a much larger extent 
than through distributing food. Joining income advocacy with existing local food initiatives 
would also consolidate power among civil society for mobilizing upon the right to food, but 
without allowing governments to evade their obligations to this right, as we will discuss later in 
this article.   
Accountability  
As the “primary duty bearer” of rights, the state is responsible for guaranteeing both 
market and non-market income at levels that are sufficient for procuring food. In “food bank 
nations” such as Canada, this federal responsibility has been unfairly downloaded onto 
provincial governments, municipalities, communities, and individuals who are struggling to bear 
this burden. Moreover, it has been offloaded to the corporate sector which stands to profit from 





eroded welfare entitlements, along with the recognition of these as inalienable rights, to the 
extent that food insecurity is now persistent and widespread (Riches, 2018; Riches & Tarasuk, 
2014). Evidently, neoliberal regimes cannot be trusted to uphold their obligations to citizens 
independently. While rights are to be primarily borne by the state, their enforcement requires 
political pressure from above (international bodies) and, more importantly, from below (civil 
society). 
International Law 
Canada has ratified several international agreements enshrining the right to food, first 
established in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, then reinforced at the 1996 
World Food Summit, and further developed in the 1999 International Covenant of Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESR) (Riches 2018). As a treaty that is technically legally 
binding, the ICESR (1999) – if enforced – can potentially move Canadian social policy towards 
compliance with international law, particularly in terms of “respect[ing], protect[ing], and 
fulfill[ing]” the right to food (Riches et al., 2004; Ziegler et al., 2011).  
“Respect” runs contrary to policies that deny access to food for vulnerable populations, 
essentially leaving them to the indignity of “institutionalized begging” (Riches et al., 2004; 
Riches, 2020, slide 15). These hostile policies include punitive welfare reforms that discriminate 
against the “undeserving poor” (Riches, 2018); wages, benefits, and income assistance rates that 
have failed to keep up with costs of living (Dachner & Tarasuk, 2018); as well as rollbacks to tax 
and labour regulations in the corporate sector (Procyk, 2014). The “protection” of rights, then, 
requires the regulation of actors that would otherwise violate the rights of others (Ziegler et al., 
2011). Rights violations, particularly in an exploitative labour market, may be prevented by 
increases to the minimum wage, corporate taxation, inclusive hiring requirements, employer 
contributions to the Canada Pension Plan (CPP), Employment Insurance (EI), and worker’s 
compensation, as well as strengthened maternity and parental leave wage replacements. 
Following the removal of barriers to rights, the most important intervention is to pro-
actively “fulfill” access to rights, particularly for vulnerable populations (Ziegler et al., 2011). 
The right to food, by way of poverty reduction, dictates the provision of adequate income 
supports (social assistance, disability payments, EI) and social services (affordable housing, child 
care, prescription medication) to all who require them (Riches et al., 2004). This may involve not 
only restoring and reinforcing but also re-configuring Canada’s welfare system. 
Universal Rights, Redistributive Justice 
For their part, fragmented, uncoordinated, and inadequately funded welfare programs are 
not designed to maximize access to rights, much less justice. The majority of income assistance 
programs (social assistance, disability, EI) are predicated on need, which is often attached to 
stigma, political resistance, and restrictions, such as means testing. By contrast, universal 
benefits, such as Medicare, are understood to be rights and tend to be more socially acceptable, 






recommend that this model extend to full support or subsidies for various other rights including 
universal pharmacare, post-secondary education, childcare, and housing, all of which reinforce 
the right to food.  
However, “one-size-fits-all” solutions that homogenize social groups, such as universal 
social programs, still fail to address the specific needs of diverse populations and the inequitable 
socio-economic outcomes they experience, and require multi-dimensional, targeted measures to 
rectify. The full realization of social and economic rights, then, will likely require a combination 
of uniform, and redistributive policy measures. To illustrate this point, the Canadian Centre of 
Policy Alternatives (CCPA) proposed an Alternative Federal Budget characterized by roughly 
equal program spending and negatively proportional cash transfers across income brackets 
(Figure 1) (Canadian Centre of Policy Alternatives, 2016). This would ensure not only that social 
benefits are spread across the board, but, more importantly, that low-income households stand to 
benefit the most. 
Figure 1 
 
Note. Distribution of financial impacts across income deciles in the 2016 Alternative Federal Budget. 
From CCPA (2016).  
As a resource that underpins myriad rights, an adequate income ought to be a universal 
entitlement delivered to those who lack one. Similar to CCPA’s (2016) model, this may assume 
the form of a BIG administered through a progressive tax and transfer system into which 
currently disparate programs can be folded (Lightman & Lightman, 2017). Compared with flat-
rate welfare programs based on restrictive eligibility criteria, a BIG is administered more 
broadly, efficiently, and flexibly, with less stigma,. Nevertheless, social programs must not be 
integrated at the expense of policies that specifically respond to vulnerable populations and 
should not be designated based on whether they “deserve” assistance. The right to food is 






Legal or Social Justice? 
Although a number of international bodies (the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights; the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights ; the FAO Right to Food Team, the UN Human Rights Council, and 
the UN Special Rapporteur to the Right to Food) technically govern the right to food, their legal 
response to violations has been non-existent thus far (Riches, 2018). This is likely due to 
geopolitics: international coalitions, even those functioning to uphold human rights, contain 
neoliberal trade networks (e.g. OECD countries) that have produced inequality both between and 
within member nations. Insofar as the right to food threatens the global “race to the bottom” in 
labour regulations, we suspect that the overriding political incentive would be to uphold, rather 
than challenge, the status quo. 
We also question the utility of legal justice, which rarely works in favour of social 
justice; more often, it achieves the opposite. Canadian courts have consistently neglected social 
and economic rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, established at the advent of 
neoliberalism in 1982, and since reinterpreted from this ideological perspective. Accordingly, 
“positive rights” that require direct government spending and action, including rights to food, 
housing, and an adequate standard of living, have been politically unattractive to institutions 
devoted to deregulation and austerity (Track, 2015).  
Consider the last significant poverty case considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
2002, Gosselin v Quebec. The plaintiff challenged a devastating reduction in social assistance for 
Quebec residents under age 30 on the basis that it violated sections 7, the “right to life, liberty, 
and security,” and section 15, the “right to equality” (Riches et al., 2004; Track, 2015). 
According to Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, these claims did not qualify as “special 
circumstance[s]” for positive obligation from the state (Track, 2015), as if income rates one-third 
of that necessary to cover food, clothing, and shelter were unexceptional. Such is the extent to 
which HFI has been normalized in “food bank nations.” 
By contrast to positive obligations, Canadian authorities tend to privilege “negative 
rights,” traditionally conceived as civil and political rights, which command non-interference 
from the state or other parties. This preference belies the state’s neoliberal notion of market and 
individual freedom, to which redistributive economic policies are seen as disruptive (Track, 
2015). And yet, there is no freedom in the inability to feed oneself, much less to participate in 
civil society, if basic needs are not met. The overlooked and undermined right to food is a 
precondition for the civil and political rights that the state purports to value. 
Regardless of judicial outcomes, legal frameworks can nonetheless draw crucial public 
attention to injustice. In this sense, the right to food may be more effective as an educational and 
organizing tool (Fisher, 2017) than as a legal instrument. If the de-politicization of hunger is part 






objectivity or mask neoliberalism. Instead, the bulk of political pressure likely lies in collective 
rather than legal action. 
Civil Society 
Under the right to food framework, the role of civil society is not necessarily to assume 
the state’s responsibility for HFI reduction but to hold it accountable to that responsibility. The 
nonprofit sector currently represents the primary response to HFI, even though it is a serious 
public health concern requiring extensive public policy solutions that cannot be replaced with 
charity. It is important to note that leading up to the Great Depression, the Canadian welfare state 
originally grew to fill widespread deficiencies in social supports, which were the traditional 
domain of families and communities (Lightman & Lightman, 2017). Today we risk a return to 
the very conditions that made the welfare state necessary.  
Although communities should continue to produce or provide food for those in need, they 
must also leverage their position to condemn, rather than to inadvertently conceal, the 
perpetuation of this need by neoliberal authorities. Food insecure people and their allies represent 
a potentially sizeable source of political pressure that has been defused by “uncritical solidarity” 
in the nonprofit sector (Riches, 2018), disempowered by a lack of representation in discourse, 
and dismissed by the world at large. While some community initiatives have been exemplars in 
drawing attention to the unacceptable political conditions behind the needs of their clientele, 
these programs are the exception. One such model can be found in an Ontario “union” of church 
food pantry volunteers entitled “Freedom 90,” a name that captures the desire of members to 
“retire” from volunteering by 90 (Fisher, 2017). They have pragmatically confronted the paradox 
of food charity by providing charitable food assistance while at the same time advocating for 
poverty reduction policies that would eliminate the need for their services. By contrast to typical 
charitable initiatives, which have become entrenched in society, Freedom 90’s ultimate goal is to 
make the very sector in which it operates – food banks – obsolete. If obsolescence is the 
objective, it makes sense that such political action would occur in spheres that are farther 
removed from corporate control, namely community-based food programs as opposed to 
centralized food bank networks that operate under heavy corporate influence. 
To mobilize effectively for social action, communities will need to evolve from simply 
putting food on the table to inviting missing voices to the table regarding HFI and poverty. That 
way, Fisher (2017) argues, “they begin to see themselves as actors in their own lives rather than 
being acted upon” (p. 3). Once again, we find that the right to food is inseparable from civil and 
political liberties. Following the list of recommendations for civil society (Table 1) and 
policymakers (Table 2) below (in no particular order), we conclude this article by reiterating the 









Recommendations for civil society 
Objective Action 
Discursive clarity • Commit to a definition of food insecurity that emphasizes the 
underlying issue of inadequate income. More intuitive terms 
include “food poverty” and “domestic hunger in the rich world” 
• Distinguish food insecurity from food security and its attendant 
responses such as charity, local food production and food literacy 
education 
Narrative change • Change the narrative surrounding the redistribution of surplus 
food: instead of a “win-win” solution for environment and society, 
it is a by-product of both a wasteful food system and an 
inadequate social safety net 
• Establish a long-term goal of ending, not perpetuating or 
ameliorating, demand for food charity 
• Incorporate the Right to Food into community food program 
principles and practices, holding the state accountable to 
unfulfilled social entitlements that communities are now trying 
and failing to meet 
Empowerment • Provide mutual aid to food insecure people while drawing 
attention to the political economic conditions that make this aid 
necessary 
• Empower participants to express their rights to food, housing, and 
other basic necessities, as well as advocate for the social policies 
required to fulfill them 
• Join poverty activism with local food movement and decentralized 
charitable initiatives and discourses, establishing new partnerships 













• Develop robust income policies that are indexed to the cost of 
living, including increases to social programs (e.g., Employment 
Insurance, disability assistance, income assistance) and labour 
entitlements (e.g., the minimum wage) 
• Strengthen programs that reduce costs of living and promote social 
inclusion (e.g., subsidized housing, extended prescription 
coverage, employment training, and national childcare) 
• Consider implementing a Basic Income Guarantee, administered 
through progressive taxes and transfers, without eroding existing 
social supports 
• Develop policies that support care work and the right to feed (e.g., 
extended parental leaves and increased wage replacements) 
Accountability • Establish and monitor food insecurity reduction targets in 
provincial and national poverty reduction strategies 
 
Beggars or Choosers: Arriving at the Right to Food 
One could say that something is rotten in the state of Canada. The decay goes much 
deeper than spoiled food, right down to the “unholy alliance” between anti-hunger groups, 
corporations, and governments (Fisher, 2017). We have only grown accustomed to the stench, 
often disguised beneath the aroma of “sweet charity,” a neologism Poppendieck (1999) uses to 
question the expanding support for charitable food initiatives that have replaced government 
welfare programs. Amid mass publicity for food production and provisioning initiatives, it is 
deeply concerning that we have left behind the casualties of “roll-back” neoliberalism and 
forgotten about the systems that used to support them. In lieu of a functional social safety net, 
wealthy countries have merely been redistributing “leftover food” to “left-behind people” 
through the charitable sector (Riches, 2018), which is buttressed by vested corporate and 
governmental interests that have co-opted communities into their service. This arrangement 
characterizes not only food banks, but also community meals, kitchens, and gardens that 
similarly obscure poverty. Community food programs may provide food with more nutrition and 
dignity than do food banks, but their recipients ultimately remain unable to feed and advocate for 
themselves. These initiatives respond to needs rather than to rights, the crucial difference being 





Rights holders should be free to choose what to eat, whom to support politically, which 
policies to lobby for, and how to participate in civil society. For many individuals, these choices 
have been severely constrained by a lack of socio-economic resources that were formerly 
guaranteed by senior levels of government. The irony here is that neoliberal rollbacks to the 
welfare state, made in ideological service to individual freedom, have actually impeded 
autonomy for a large sector of the population. From this perspective, the regulation and 
redistribution of capital arguably liberates more than it limits. 
As an alternative to neoliberalism, the present analysis follows Lightman and Lightman’s 
(2017) institutional model of social policy in which markets are unable to meet welfare needs yet 
remain relevant in society. It is important to acknowledge that even with a robust welfare state, 
this approach leaves exploitative trade and power relations intact. Hence the imperative for civil 
society to apply political pressure, and even create alternative economies that resist dominant 
market rationalities. Within overarching and heavily entrenched systems of capitalism, however, 
we must still ensure that resources are fairly distributed in society, particularly to its most 
vulnerable members. 
In considering the rise and decline of the welfare state, we may find not only tragedy but 
potential redemption. History offers an important reminder that public policy can prioritize social 
well-being and that we can have societies without food banks – as unfathomable as that may 
seem today. “Tried and true” policy solutions to reduce or eliminate poverty and HFI already 
exist, and have existed for the greater part of the 20th century, at least until they were superseded 
by neoliberalism. Their trajectory suggests that there is nothing immutable about prevailing 
political regimes, though rights should be rendered non-negotiable if they are to withstand 
shifting ideologies.  
Safeguarding the right to food, then, will require more than a return to Keynesian 
economics, which originally fell out of favour due to the end of the consensus between labour 
and capital. Historically, labour received a slice of the economic pie as long as the pie kept 
expanding. When the pie contracts, as it did during the oil crisis of 1973, the corporate sector 
tends to engulf the public’s share (Lightman & Lightman, 2017). But, no matter how you slice it, 
whether the pie grows or shrinks, the right to food should be unequivocal. Until this is realized, 
Canada’s economic and social rights record warrants a proverbial serving of humble pie. 
Just as money buys food choice, “policy implies [political] choice” (Lightman & 
Lightman 2017, p. 324). Neoliberalism is not a given, but a policymaking decision, as is the case 
with human rights. As a self-appointed “champion” of rights, the Canadian government ought to 
put its money where the mouths of its citizens are. And if civil society were to politicize rather 
than pacify these voices, their choice would be loud and clear. In this sense, rights engender not 
only state obligations, but an ongoing negotiation for inclusion within political communities that 
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